I don’t understand the interference involving Inmarsat and Iridium handsets but if someone else does then maybe they can let us know if that’s relevant or not. Likely not.
I’m imagining a scenario where hijackers can use a satellite phone to contact an operation team via a Russian satellite and I just happened to come across that info.
I am sorry to say this, but IMO the title "Deep Dive: MH370" is unfortunate, because it immediately triggers the image of MH370's final deep/steep dive into the ocean. Surely a dreadful thought, especially for the next of kin. I suspect the title to have a double meaning including both the deep dive into the ocean and a deep dive into the rabbit hole, but still I would recommend changing the title so as not to hurt anyone.
I appreciate the feedback. I can see how the title could be read as having a double meaning, but the intention was merely to state in terms as simple as possible what the goal of the podcast would be: namely, to stand apart in its approach to the mystery by taking a microscope to the full range of evidence.
@jeffwise : yes, knowing you for a long time, I know you didn't have any bad intentions in choosing this title. Marketing considerations permitting, I honestly would change the title to something not hurtful for the NOK. I think the overarching goal of your podcast is finding MH370, so why not name it "Finding MH370" ? It seems like you are already halfway there anyway: The podcast logo already says "Finding MH370".
Effectively, I am calling it Finding MH370, while also trying to handle as graciously and non-confusingly as possible the fact that we did a first season that was called "Deep Dive MH370." So, going forward it's "Finding MH370."
Nobody is commenting, so I dare to do, although nearly repeating what I said before, and waiting for incoming. The guy fits to be part of the game, but I think the possible role of being on the plane is wrong. He being the guy to go to the electronic bay door, opening it and stepping down to take over the plane, includes to much variables, too much things to go wrong.
Imho if it was a plot and he was part of it, than he was the eye in the cabin and on the cockpit door. What he could observe from his seat was essential information necessary to give the go for action. Upon his signal the person/ persons in the electronics bay could start their work, takeover the aircraft, manipulate the vital systems of the cabin like pressure and emergency oxygen and then enter the cabin like the jack in the box by the electronics bay door. They even could do that right at the moment when the cockpit doir was opened. They had been there before the aircraft took off.
We as passengers have the feeling that an airport is safe from unauthorized entry from the outside, like a prison is safe to keep the prisoners in, but with knowledge, ruthless will, planning and bribery nothing is safe at all. Once on the apron and maybe with inside help everything is possible, entering an aircraft standing on a ramp over night unattended shouldn't be un unsolvable problem. From the electronic bay they had not only access to the cabin, but also to the forward cargo bay.
Bottom line, I can agree that the Rusky was part of the team, but with a different task.
Thanks for this comment. Funnily enough, as I found your comment I've just been reading a remarkable report on aircraft cybersecurity prepared for the FAA in the months after MH370 disappeared (I'm not saying there's a causal connection, but you never know.) To your point, it details a whole raft of potential cybersecurity vulerabilities that today's airliners have, and the 777 seems to exhibit more than its share. I'm gathering string for an episode on the ARINC 629 data bus, which is fascinating. I think you'd get a kick out of this document, and I'd love to hear what you think about it. It's at: https://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/tc14-29.pdf
The articles I’m finding quote experts that say it’s fine so long as nobody is able to access the hardware… and nobody has ever been able to hijack a plane or ship before. 👀
"Most of the electronic equipment on the aircraft are mounted on equipment racks in the various equipment centres.
The Main Equipment Centre (MEC) contains most of the electronics equipment on the aircraft. The MEC is below the passenger cabin, rear of the nose wheel well and forward of the forward cargo compartment. Access to the MEC is possible on ground or in flight. The equipment in the MEC includes electronics for these functions:
• Information Management
• Generator Control
• Transformer Rectifier
• Flight control and autopilot
• Environmental control
• Recording
• Navigation
• Communication
• Cabin Management
• Weight and balance
• Air data
• Inertial data
•Warning
• Proximity sensing
• Engine control
• Electrical Load Management.
The Forward Equipment Centre is forward of the nose wheel well and contains the two weather radar receiver/transmitters. Access to the Forward Equipment Centre is through the access door forward of the nose landing gear or through the MEC.
The passenger compartment above the Door 3 cross-aisle at station 1530 on the left of the aircraft centre line contains the satellite communication equipment.
A rack in the passenger compartment above the rear galley at station 2100 on the right side of the aircraft contains the flight recorders.
There are also equipment racks adjacent to the forward, aft and bulk cargo doors. The forward cargo racks contain the primary flight control, actuator control, radio altitude, fuel quantity and cargo handling electronics. The aft cargo racks contain the HF communication, brake and tire and main gear steering electronics. The bulk cargo racks contain the APU battery and charger." - https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2014/20140308-0_B772_9M-MRO.pdf
Other... in the passenger cabin, there was a portable emergency locator transmitter in a crew coat closet (with others packed in the slide rafts), power switches for the in-flight entertainment, lighting etc, and I don't know if cabin crew could access a PC - saw one in a purser's station but may have been an airbus on my internet travels.
Back from my ride, so I took my time to read over the linked "vulnerability report" from 2014
Bits and bites are not my main area of my competence, but bottom line the report shows the possible vulnerabilities of aircraft networks. Furthermore the report states that the FAA had neither enough means to access and evaluate such systems concerning their real vulnerability and thus control producers and users of aircraft in order to avoid possible dangers. We have to hope that this elephant in the room has changed in the last 10 years, but who knows where they are today?
"Commercial aircraft systems are routinely electronically interrogated through portable maintenance computers connected to special ports in the aircraft systems, and by other trusted users including pilots using mobile computers to support aircraft operations. Generally based on standard COTS operating systems (OS), these computers are subject to the same cyber vulnerabilities as exist in their base OS. Generally connected to commercial Internet services, these maintenance computers are often completely unprotected, both from receiving updates of aircraft software and navigation databases, as well as to the downloading of aircraft maintenance information collected while the unit is connected to the aircraft."
"Study results show that the aircraft is most vulnerable to five types of threats: 1. Manipulation of the aircraft loadable software parts and the AMI components.
2. Inadvertent or deliberate interconnection of the aircraft domains during manufacture, maintenance, or modifications.
3. Unexpected vulnerabilities to attacks directed at aircraft offboard communications links or onboard wireless aircraft control and internal communications systems, including common attacks to penetrate the aircraft domains and denial of communications services.
4. Manipulation of the aircraft digital design and software components during design, or upgrades. 5. Insertion of backdoors or malware into aircraft electronic components or systems via the supply chain during manufacture."
"The FAA should develop demonstrations of cyber risks to loadable software and AMIs to share with the industry for training. The Agency should also develop guidance for aircraft cyber security certification processes to include mandatory penetration testing of aircraft networks modeling the FSA FedRAMP process for testing cloud storage, and services for US Government
use. The study endorses developing guidance ensuring the audit of the electronic supply chain. This measure safeguards against malware or backdoors insertion into the aircraft through the installation of tampered electronic component or systems."
Thanks for this. You wrote: "We have to hope that this elephant in the room has changed in the last 10 years, but who knows where they are today?" Really, really good question.
Wish we could find out what he took on board.
I don’t understand the interference involving Inmarsat and Iridium handsets but if someone else does then maybe they can let us know if that’s relevant or not. Likely not.
I’m imagining a scenario where hijackers can use a satellite phone to contact an operation team via a Russian satellite and I just happened to come across that info.
I am sorry to say this, but IMO the title "Deep Dive: MH370" is unfortunate, because it immediately triggers the image of MH370's final deep/steep dive into the ocean. Surely a dreadful thought, especially for the next of kin. I suspect the title to have a double meaning including both the deep dive into the ocean and a deep dive into the rabbit hole, but still I would recommend changing the title so as not to hurt anyone.
I appreciate the feedback. I can see how the title could be read as having a double meaning, but the intention was merely to state in terms as simple as possible what the goal of the podcast would be: namely, to stand apart in its approach to the mystery by taking a microscope to the full range of evidence.
@jeffwise : yes, knowing you for a long time, I know you didn't have any bad intentions in choosing this title. Marketing considerations permitting, I honestly would change the title to something not hurtful for the NOK. I think the overarching goal of your podcast is finding MH370, so why not name it "Finding MH370" ? It seems like you are already halfway there anyway: The podcast logo already says "Finding MH370".
Effectively, I am calling it Finding MH370, while also trying to handle as graciously and non-confusingly as possible the fact that we did a first season that was called "Deep Dive MH370." So, going forward it's "Finding MH370."
Great. I know you are in a bind for having started out with a different title.
But I think you found an excellent solution! Thanks for listening.
Nobody is commenting, so I dare to do, although nearly repeating what I said before, and waiting for incoming. The guy fits to be part of the game, but I think the possible role of being on the plane is wrong. He being the guy to go to the electronic bay door, opening it and stepping down to take over the plane, includes to much variables, too much things to go wrong.
Imho if it was a plot and he was part of it, than he was the eye in the cabin and on the cockpit door. What he could observe from his seat was essential information necessary to give the go for action. Upon his signal the person/ persons in the electronics bay could start their work, takeover the aircraft, manipulate the vital systems of the cabin like pressure and emergency oxygen and then enter the cabin like the jack in the box by the electronics bay door. They even could do that right at the moment when the cockpit doir was opened. They had been there before the aircraft took off.
We as passengers have the feeling that an airport is safe from unauthorized entry from the outside, like a prison is safe to keep the prisoners in, but with knowledge, ruthless will, planning and bribery nothing is safe at all. Once on the apron and maybe with inside help everything is possible, entering an aircraft standing on a ramp over night unattended shouldn't be un unsolvable problem. From the electronic bay they had not only access to the cabin, but also to the forward cargo bay.
Bottom line, I can agree that the Rusky was part of the team, but with a different task.
Thanks for this comment. Funnily enough, as I found your comment I've just been reading a remarkable report on aircraft cybersecurity prepared for the FAA in the months after MH370 disappeared (I'm not saying there's a causal connection, but you never know.) To your point, it details a whole raft of potential cybersecurity vulerabilities that today's airliners have, and the 777 seems to exhibit more than its share. I'm gathering string for an episode on the ARINC 629 data bus, which is fascinating. I think you'd get a kick out of this document, and I'd love to hear what you think about it. It's at: https://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/tc14-29.pdf
I’ll join you in commenting RetiredF4 ☺️👋🏻
The articles I’m finding quote experts that say it’s fine so long as nobody is able to access the hardware… and nobody has ever been able to hijack a plane or ship before. 👀
Before 20. July 1969 no human being had been on the moon.
The hardware is in the electronics bay, isn't it?
Hope this is helpful
"Most of the electronic equipment on the aircraft are mounted on equipment racks in the various equipment centres.
The Main Equipment Centre (MEC) contains most of the electronics equipment on the aircraft. The MEC is below the passenger cabin, rear of the nose wheel well and forward of the forward cargo compartment. Access to the MEC is possible on ground or in flight. The equipment in the MEC includes electronics for these functions:
• Information Management
• Generator Control
• Transformer Rectifier
• Flight control and autopilot
• Environmental control
• Recording
• Navigation
• Communication
• Cabin Management
• Weight and balance
• Air data
• Inertial data
•Warning
• Proximity sensing
• Engine control
• Electrical Load Management.
The Forward Equipment Centre is forward of the nose wheel well and contains the two weather radar receiver/transmitters. Access to the Forward Equipment Centre is through the access door forward of the nose landing gear or through the MEC.
The passenger compartment above the Door 3 cross-aisle at station 1530 on the left of the aircraft centre line contains the satellite communication equipment.
A rack in the passenger compartment above the rear galley at station 2100 on the right side of the aircraft contains the flight recorders.
There are also equipment racks adjacent to the forward, aft and bulk cargo doors. The forward cargo racks contain the primary flight control, actuator control, radio altitude, fuel quantity and cargo handling electronics. The aft cargo racks contain the HF communication, brake and tire and main gear steering electronics. The bulk cargo racks contain the APU battery and charger." - https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2014/20140308-0_B772_9M-MRO.pdf
Other... in the passenger cabin, there was a portable emergency locator transmitter in a crew coat closet (with others packed in the slide rafts), power switches for the in-flight entertainment, lighting etc, and I don't know if cabin crew could access a PC - saw one in a purser's station but may have been an airbus on my internet travels.
Thank's for the link, I'll comeback to it when I'm home again after my 14 day bike tour. Working on a small iphone display s....s.
Wow, jealous. Enjoy your ride!
Back from my ride, so I took my time to read over the linked "vulnerability report" from 2014
Bits and bites are not my main area of my competence, but bottom line the report shows the possible vulnerabilities of aircraft networks. Furthermore the report states that the FAA had neither enough means to access and evaluate such systems concerning their real vulnerability and thus control producers and users of aircraft in order to avoid possible dangers. We have to hope that this elephant in the room has changed in the last 10 years, but who knows where they are today?
Following copy and paste out of the report https://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/tc14-29.pdf
"Commercial aircraft systems are routinely electronically interrogated through portable maintenance computers connected to special ports in the aircraft systems, and by other trusted users including pilots using mobile computers to support aircraft operations. Generally based on standard COTS operating systems (OS), these computers are subject to the same cyber vulnerabilities as exist in their base OS. Generally connected to commercial Internet services, these maintenance computers are often completely unprotected, both from receiving updates of aircraft software and navigation databases, as well as to the downloading of aircraft maintenance information collected while the unit is connected to the aircraft."
"Study results show that the aircraft is most vulnerable to five types of threats: 1. Manipulation of the aircraft loadable software parts and the AMI components.
2. Inadvertent or deliberate interconnection of the aircraft domains during manufacture, maintenance, or modifications.
3. Unexpected vulnerabilities to attacks directed at aircraft offboard communications links or onboard wireless aircraft control and internal communications systems, including common attacks to penetrate the aircraft domains and denial of communications services.
4. Manipulation of the aircraft digital design and software components during design, or upgrades. 5. Insertion of backdoors or malware into aircraft electronic components or systems via the supply chain during manufacture."
"The FAA should develop demonstrations of cyber risks to loadable software and AMIs to share with the industry for training. The Agency should also develop guidance for aircraft cyber security certification processes to include mandatory penetration testing of aircraft networks modeling the FSA FedRAMP process for testing cloud storage, and services for US Government
use. The study endorses developing guidance ensuring the audit of the electronic supply chain. This measure safeguards against malware or backdoors insertion into the aircraft through the installation of tampered electronic component or systems."
Thanks for this. You wrote: "We have to hope that this elephant in the room has changed in the last 10 years, but who knows where they are today?" Really, really good question.
I wonder if a portable maintenance computer was on board? Electronic Flight Bag?